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Introduction
It is a well-known principle of economics that a producer of one product benefits from enhanced competition among producers of complementary products. Yet the implications of this principle for antitrust policy are less well developed in the academic literature. We explore these implications using a popular theoretical model in which two firms exist in a vertical upstream-downstream relationship -the upstream firms sets the price of an intermediate product and the downstream firm then sets the price of the final product.
We augment the model by permitting each firm to enter the other's market. Entry is costly and constrains prices in the affected market. The model takes the form of a twostage game -the firms make entry decisions in the first stage and set prices in the second stage. We demonstrate that equilibria exist in which one or both firms choose to enter. Double-marginalization is mitigated in these equilibria. Further, if both firms enter then the downstream price can be lower than the joint profit maximizing level. The results imply that coordination (e.g., through merger) between two firms in a vertical relationship can be anticompetitive provided that each firm exerts competitive pressure in the other's market.
We develop two auxiliary results. First, we show that entry may be profitable for one or both firms even when entry would be unprofitable for a hypothetical third party; the distinction is due to the positive effect on margins in the complimentary market. In that sense, each firm in the vertical relationship can be uniquely positioned to compete in the other's market. Second, we show that entrants need not be efficient relative to the incumbent firms for coordination to be anticompetitive. Indeed, some level of entrant inefficiency is needed to support an equilibrium in which both firms enter the other's market; the presence of fully efficient entrants would prevent the firms from recouping the sunk cost of entry through their margins in their original markets.
Our work contributes to a burgeoning theoretical literature that examines competition among producers of complementary products. Packalen (2009) Our work also has implications for the theory of divided technical leadership. The theory, as espoused by Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999) , states that the struggle for technical leadership among complementary firms can induce entry, technology races, and"epochal" competition. By contrast, our results suggest that firms may establish follower positions in complementary markets, even if those positions are weak and mainly serve to constrain pricing. Thus, for example, our results could rationalize Microsoft's recent launch of Bing in the market for online consumer search, insofar as the existence of a Google competitor creates positive externalities for Microsoft's positions in operating systems and applications.
Model 2.1 The game
The model is a two-stage game featuring two firms in a vertical upstream-downstream relationship. In the first stage, the firms simultaneously decide whether to enter the other's market. If neither firm enters then both firms are monopolists in their respective markets. In the second stage, the firms set prices and payoffs are realized. The solution concept we employ is pure-strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). We compare the outcomes of this game against an alternative scenario in which the two firm merge prior to the entry stage. In this alternative scenario, entry does not occur and the firms price to maximize joint profits. We illustrate the timing of the model in Figure 1 . 
We represent the entry stage as the following non-cooperative normal 2x2 game:
We refer to the outcome of the game as (σ U , σ D ) where σ U and σ D are the actions of the upstream and downstream firms, respectively. Payoffs correspond to the Nash equilibrium 2 of the subsequent pricing stage. We denote the payoffs of player x when there is entry in market y as π 
Payoffs
In In the alternative merger scenario, the firms set a downstream price of α 2β
, which maximizes joint profits. Outcomes of the two-stage game are characterized by double-marginalization whenever the downstream price exceeds this level. We refer to the vertical merger as anticompetitive if the pure-strategy SPNE of the two-stage game produces a downstream price lower than the joint profit maximizing level.
Solutions
The solution concept is pure-strategy SPNE. The symmetry of the game guarantees the existence of at least one such equilibrium: Proposition 1. There exists at least one pure-strategy SPNE equilibrium in the 2x2 game.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. We exploit the equalities π We evaluate the equilibria graphically in Figure 2 for specific parameter combinations. We consider the demand parameters α = 10 and β = 1, and focus on the two-dimensional parameter space defined by c ∈ [0, 5] and f ∈ [0, 30]. The solid lines delineate five regions, and we examine each region in turn.
Region I is defined by the parameter space over which (Enter, Enter) is a unique equilibrium. Within this region, the upstream firm uses entry to constrain the prices of the downstream firm, and vice-versa. The firms recoup the sunk cost of entry in the subsequent price competition because entrants only partially dampen the margins of the incumbents. The bounds on the region are intuitive. Sunk costs cannot be too great, and entrants must be efficient enough to constrain prices but not so efficient that margins are eliminated. This region is important for antitrust policy because downstream prices are lower than the joint profit maximizing level for entrant marginal costs that are sufficiently low (c < α 4β
). We plot this threshold with a dotted line. The sub-regions I A and I B map the parameter regions in which the downstream price is lower and higher than the joint profit maximizing price, respectively, so that vertical merger is anticompetitive in sub-region I A .
We now discuss the other regions plotted in Figure 2 :
• Region II is defined by the parameter space over which (Enter, Enter) and (Do Not Enter, Do Not Enter) are the two equilibria. The latter equilibrium yields higher profits • Region III is defined by the parameter space over which (Enter, Do Not Enter) and (Do Not Enter, Enter) are the two equilibria. The efficiency of the entrants creates a situation in which each firm can recoup the sunk costs of entry only if the other firm does not enter. Downstream prices exceed the joint profit maximizing level.
• Region IV is defined by the parameter space over which (Do Not Enter, Enter) is the unique equilibrium (i.e., the downstream firm enters the upstream market). Absent entry, the upstream firm earns greater margins than the downstream firm due to its ability to set a take-it-or-leave-it price. These margins induce the downstream firm to enter. Downstream prices exceed the joint profit maximizing level.
• Region V is defined by the parameter space over which (Do Not Enter, Do Not Enter) is the unique equilibrium. Sunk costs are high and entrants are inefficient. Downstream prices exceed the joint profit maximizing level.
Discussion
We formalize the intuition that firms in a vertical relationship have an incentive to introduce competition into the others' markets, and that the elimination of this incentive (e.g., through coordination/merger) can be anticompetitive. We employ the simplest possible modeling framework because the intuition itself is straight-forward. Extensions to the model could generate additional results -one could incorporate more general functional forms, a tradeoff between entry costs and entrant efficiency, and/or first-mover advantages. We leave these extensions to future work.
